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Introduction 
 
 War is often thought to be defined by the conflict between states, and the conflict 
resolution has traditionally thought to be handled by the state up until recently. The War in Iraq 
showed the US government and armed forces specifically deploy outsource different forms of its 
services to the private sector to achieve the goals of the stat. Let’s backtrack to an earlier period, 
lesser known for private warfare, to the end of the 20th Century when the Cold War was in its 
latter stages, and the Soviet Union versus United States conflict has encompassed the entire 
globe. The emergence of Ronald Reagan’s presidency shifted the trajectory of the Cold War, 
global system, and military conflicts. Latin America because of being the proverbial “backyard 
of the US” bore the brunt of the reemerged aggressiveness in US foreign policy under Ronald 
Reagan. Nicaragua became a central focus of the transnational fight against communism for the 
US at this time along with Colombia in a more regional scope. With US interests at stake in both 
countries military intervention in a traditional sense, US troops on the ground are expected to be 
on the scene but in Colombia, Nicaragua something different occurred.  
The Reagan Administration introduced a theme to all of the general foreign policy goals 
across the board in Regan’s first year in office which was to reassert the US as the premier force 
and to represent strength in the world. A title according to Republicans of the 1970’s and 1980’s 
that was lost under the Carter administration.1 The President pledged to achieve this with the 
expansion of the US enterprise to promote free trade, assisting economic development in poorer 
nations, standing firmly by democratic allies and “keeping faith with anti-Communist 
revolutionaries.”.2 The pledges made by President Reagan were made to reflect a greater 
American move to neoliberalism and privatization. Communist ideology directly threatened 
                                               
1 Pach, Chester. "The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy." Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 
(2006): 75-88. 
2
 Pach, Chester. "The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy." 77. 
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privatization the overarching goal of America’s dominant presence abroad. In Nicaragua, the 
Sandinista revolution, a socialist takeover of the political climate in the state happened in 1979 
the year before Reagan was elected. With the Sandinistas in power of the proper Nicaraguan 
government, only a violent regime could attempt to sabotage or overthrow the regime. Around 
the same time during the late 1970’s the global illegal cocaine trade took off to new heights 
centered around Colombian manufacturing flowing through Central America to its main 
destination of the United States. The cocaine epidemic in the United States became a central 
issue originally for domestic politics in the “War on Drugs” campaign but later a part of 
Reagan’s foreign policy. Thus, two main features of what became known as the Reagan Doctrine 
would become fighting communism by all means in any capacity and protecting drugs from 
coming into the United States.  
To achieve the main goals of American foreign policy under Reagan, the military budget 
of the US had to extend its resources. The US military, CIA, DEA under the greater umbrella of 
US defense spearheaded efforts in providing support to anti-communist political groups ready for 
armed conflict. However, in the spirit of privatization even defense historically a venture taken 
on directly by the state (representing the state directly) was up for change as well. Introduction of 
Private Military Companies and defense contracting seemed only natural. Though the history of 
the United States use of PMCs to augment the standard demands of regular military proceeds, the 
1980’s the change the value of these firms greatly increased at this time. Millions of dollars of 
were allocated between US defense departments to private firms willing and able to take on 
security measures of Western states. It’s also important to note in the timing of the 1980’s 
especially the latter half which was Reagan’s second term that allowed for PMC’s to be a more 
sought after option for members of Congress who had endured the previous decade. 
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Transitioning from the polarity of the Nixon/Carter decade defined Reagan’s ability to convince 
the people of such Foreign Policy hinged on the notion that Carter led a weak US international 
image. Republicans portrayed Carter's exit strategy out of civil conflicts across the globe as the 
reason that left pockets of the world vulnerable to communist influence because of his refusal to 
support anti-communist regimes which often had shady human rights records. All came to a  
Given this negative imagery leading into the 1980 US presidential election, Reagan was able to 
push for a more interventionist strategy abroad to combat communism and other security threats. 
However, the sting of what was understood by the American people as a defeat in the Vietnam 
War left many lawmakers and constituents alike apprehensive towards committing swaths of 
troops to various areas of the “peripheral world.”  
In this paper I will examine then argue how the introduction of PMC’s to wars in Latin 
America under Reagan may not have been the first attempt at privatizing warfare but the 
substantial trial in which changed the landscape of the US government's usage PMCs in the 
future.  Overall the focus of the research is to provide a layout a potential answer to the successes 
and failures of replacing a traditionally government-handled job to the hands of actors in the 
private sectors. The United States during the 1980’s during the two terms under President Ronald 
Reagan examined and the carrying out of US foreign policy through means of military 
contracting is the private case to be evaluated. Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast 
Asia are all valuable regions to take as case studies of the privatization of war, but the US 
resurged no-nonsense approach in taking down leftist organizations in Latin America more 
intriguing. The paper will analyze US relations to Nicaragua and Central America anti-
communist regimes which were the first region mentioned by Reagan’s first ambassador to the 
UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick. Colombia is to be examined as well because the country provides a 
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unique case where different branches of the US different department working at the same time, 
originally to fight communism but in the later part of the 1980’s the illegal cocaine monopolies 
in Colombia. The PMC’s deployed by the US in Colombia followed a similar path originally 
implemented to attack leftist guerrilla organizations but later to curb drugs flowing out of 
Colombia. 
An examination into the details of PMC’s actions in a handful of roles contracted to do 
for US military interventions in Colombia and Nicaragua are not only significant to shed light on 
the history of the conflict but the potential trajectory of US military interventions in the future. 
It’s a known fact amongst US foreign policy scholars and those who pay attention to any 
political news that PMC’s has not only continued to contemporary US conflicts but increased 
proliferation. My argument to why PMC and mercenary usage rates have increased since 
Reagan’s time in office is broken into three distinct explanations. My first argument about the 
increased contracting of PMC’s by the US is the idea of the military industrial complex and how 
that not only shifted to the private sector during the 1980’s but allowed the private security 
industry to flourish. My next reason is the factor of Plausible Deniability which is less concrete 
and means in the case of US foreign policy that Presidents in collaboration with their closest 
advisors can avoid accountability for the military actions they may directly be involved in 
because of the outsourcing with defense spending. Within this point, I want to examine 
transparency and the major shifts in the way that the Contra War and War on Drugs were 
reported to give any indication on the pressure put on Reagan’s foreign policy decisions in the 
respective countries. The last explanation has to do directly with the success and failures of 
adding private contractors into combat which is the ability for PMC’s to perform duties beyond 
the normal scope of what US military personnel does. 
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This project is constructed into three different sections with a conclusion following those 
three sections. The initial section will lay out the details of the Foreign Policy strategies laid out 
in Nicaragua and Colombia specifically. All vital actors in both the war against communism and 
“war on drugs” in both countries will be examined. Included in this section will be many of the 
major laid out initiatives that could define American foreign policy as precisely as possible to 
give indications of what would be indications of potential successes or failures post-operations. 
Holistically section I should give the project a sense of what to look for in later sections that will 
get into the depths of what happened in both countries during this specific period. Readers and I 
should have an understanding going into the conclusion standards set by the US administration 
itself on what would be a successful or failed campaign. The second section will explore 
DynCorp and its role in the conflicts in Latin America. The actions of the company and what can 
be associated with the private war separately from American military forces will be evaluated on 
its own about the state's conflicts. The emergence of mercenary usage within Nicaragua's Contra 
War will be reviewed in Section II with answers defining the knowledge of PMC deployment at 
the time also being kept in mind. The last section will include the data and evidence used in 
supporting claims of both success or failure of specific targets of Foreign Policy in Latin 
America in regards to the jobs done by PMCs. With the results of the military interventions 
within Colombia and Nicaragua during along with after the implementation of PMC force in 
regards to the broader narratives of stopping communism and cocaine trafficking. With the 
history understood about the historical outcomes about the Reagan Doctrine, my thesis regarding 
the trends of PMC proliferation is reflected with contextual evidence with Colombia and 
Nicaragua serving as both regional but intrinsically larger examples of US foreign policy.  
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Chapter I: Reagan Doctrine: Central America and Colombia in Focus 
 
In 1987 the annual federal budget proposal for that specific fiscal year was released by 
the U.S. government with a written message from President Reagan. The statement defined 
Privatization as a wholesale strategy representative of the major theme to underline all Reagan’s 
policies which were defined by neoliberal intentions set out in concrete rhetoric that would 
define the shift in American grand strategy.3 Reagan in his proposal stated the federal 
government’s privatization policy push as, “a strategy to shift the production of goods and 
services from the Government to the private sector to reduce Government expenditures and to 
take of the efficiencies that normally [occur in the private marketplace].” Unlike many other 
budget proposals of past administrations, the implications of Reagan’s strategies were to create a 
direct relationship between domestic and foreign policy. The benefits of tapping into the private 
sector in areas traditionally involving federal programs weren’t just for the benefits of reduced 
spending but also what the Reagan Administration saw as potential outcomes from efficiency. 
The cutting of funding wasn’t a part of the reduction of scope in the federal budget; military 
spending increased over every year in his first term from 1981-1984 which led to a larger surplus 
of spending.”4 In every department aside from the department of defense, the emphasis was on 
cutting funding towards programs and decreasing the role of individual departments. In the area 
of military expenditures and strategies, the emphasis was on efficient usage not downsizing or 
cutting defense spending. One of the major aspects of all commercial activities related to the US 
was the focus on cost-efficient production.5 This type of production was supposed to take 
pressure off the Federal government from having to maintain its military assets for months to 
                                               
3 Williams, Phil. "The Reagan Administration and Defence Policy." The Reagan Presidency, 1990, 199-230. 
4  Weiss, Linda. America Inc.?: Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State. 22 
5 Solomon, Robert. "Budget Deficits and Federal Reserve Policy." The Brookings Review 2, no. 3 (1984): 22-55.  
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years after proposed spending on the resources. The way Reagan’s administration was able to 
follow through with their lofty efficient military spending goals was the utilization of military 
contracts.6 Following the greater purpose of privatization, contracting-out in defense terms 
means the federal government is asking a private company for material military production or 
military services. In the 1980’s the services and production demand greatly increased which 
meant the suppliers, private military industry boomed as well. 
 Introduced earlier was the Reagan administration's rekindling of the fire for the US to 
exterminate the great enemy which was the Soviet Union and the communist ideology around the 
globe. The renewed heating of the Cold War meant that the initial tasks of the Reagan 
administration were to urge Congress from a lukewarm stance against fighting the Soviet 
influence to treating support of anti-communist fighters as self-defense. The complexity of the 
getting Congress to support funding such efforts of sending aid to Soviet resistance groups was a 
case by a case study that varied. A big issue was the regime type that the US was supporting 
abroad, totalitarian regimes were often cited by lawmakers 1970’s as being incredibly 
problematic. The Human Rights decade of the 1970’s brought on a new sense of awareness of 
the direct actions of US forces abroad and where US resources were going. Supporting 
democratic states wasn’t a complicated process for Congress to cosign during the 1980’s nor was 
fighting communist totalitarian regimes such as the government propped up in Afghanistan from 
1979-89 by the Soviet Union.7 Confusion arose for the Reagan Administration and US officials 
early in Reagan’s tenure when dealing with states in Central America. Many of the Latin 
American countries of the 1980’s were a part of the so-called democratic revolution experience a 
                                               
6  Petersohn, Ulrich. "The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War 
Severity between 1946 and 2002." International Interactions 40, no. 2 (2014): 191-215.  
7 Pach, Chester. "The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy." Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 
(2006): 75-88.  
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reactionary movement supported by the US (in most cases) after post-colonial decades of 
political unrest and dictatorships. In Central America, countries leadership were supported by the 
US to combat communism and embrace Western values.8 One of the major challenges early on 
for many of closest foreign policy advisors of Reagan such as Ambassador to the UN Jeane 
Kirkpatrick and CIA director William Casey was to make a case to attack democratic socialist or 
communist states. The Leftist Sandinista regime that overthrew the Somoza dictatorship of 
Nicaragua in 1979 was not a representation of this democratic socialist state on the onset but 
later proved to be. In 1984 over 60% of the Nicaraguan general election votes went to Daniel 
Ortega head of the FSLN party confirming the country's status as a democratic socialist type.9 
The barriers brought on by the actual practice of civil society pushed the Reagan Administration 
to new subversive heights and creative ways of intervention. Mercenaries or Private Military 
Companies allow for covert intervention arguably in ways that a pure state intervention can’t. 
 The Civil Wars in Latin America especially Central America were blamed by 
conservative American politicians as the “Moscow-Havana axis.” Fear of Cuba sparking 
communist revolutionaries and inciting hatred toward the US was another major reason the 
Reagan Administration felt the need to refocus its Foreign Policy agenda back on Latin America. 
The first major security strategy presented by the Reagan administration reflected those fears and 
emphasized the outcomes of guerrilla fighting. The U.S. National Security Strategy of 1982 
stated that fighting back Soviet expansion was a chief aspect towards a foreign policy which 
included, “to increase costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist and subversive 
forces.”10. The strategy went beyond normal conditions of US practices of war but meeting the 
Soviet Union subversive tactics with subversive often controversial tactics of their own. 
                                               
8 Close, David. "The Nicaraguan Elections of 1984." Electoral Studies 4, no. 2 (1985): 152-68.  
9 Close, David. "The Nicaraguan Elections of 1984." 155. 
10 Pach, Chester. "The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy." 82. 
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“Plausible deniability” was an incredibly significant part of the ability for the higher chain of 
command of the US military and government to employ these controversial tactics. Deniability 
was what the Commander-in-Chief, Military Departments, and Generals sought to increase the 
strength of the morale of foreign “freedom” fighters in proxy conflicts without retributions from 
a skeptical post-Vietnam congress.11 The contracting of private military firms to train these 
freedom fighters around the globe and provide security to their camps was directly a result of 
Plausible Deniability. The focus during Reagan’s first term in office was on results, and as long 
as American made weapons were killing Soviet-backed fighters, the fight was heading in the 
positive direction. As a result, through use of the coded language of deniability and the fact that 
there was a lack of physical American troops on the ground in places such as Nicaragua the 
funding for the National Security Strategy from 1982 to 1984 skyrocketed.12 
 The tenacity of the Reagan Doctrine throughout his terms in office is defined by the 
strong characters around him that led his agencies. Key agencies such as the CIA, DEA, and 
NSA often played an important part in defining the role of PMC’s. The CIA’s budget for 
overseas operations in countries of communist concern was enormous, and often it was the CIA 
going beyond analysis and into much of the training of anti-communist forces during the early 
1980’s.13 The CIA under William Casey was in sync with the defense department regarding its 
relentless commitment to combat Communism. The CIA was chiefly fixated on the Soviet 
Union, looking for ways in which “third-world” governments infrastructure could be damaged to 
lean away from US influence or were outright Soviet-supported. The CIA’s projects were 
supposed to be covert more under the radar compared to major military operations which needed 
                                               
11  Petersohn, Ulrich. "The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War 
Severity between 1946 and 2002." 203. 
12 Pach, Chester. "The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy." 80. 
13 Weiss, Linda. America Inc.?: Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State. 24. 
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a stronger consensus from not just Congress but a watchful International Community. A fast-
paced start to the Reagan presidency led to the revelation of many of the secret operations of the 
US government through the CIA becoming not so secretive forcing congress members on both 
sides of the aisle to demand authorization for such ventures.14 Operations involving subversive 
tactics that violated international norms, mainly accusations against the US for violating state 
rights of sovereignty with the meddling of Latin American nations governmental procedures. 
Consequentially, many plans of the CIA were done without knowledge or synchronization of all 
the department heads on board which meant the relationship between the private sector to the US 
federal departments were between representatives of departments to CEO’s of companies rather 
than a co-signing of the entire government for decisions.15 What makes foreign policy difficult to 
evaluate is when there isn’t a succinct vision that represents broadly “US” as a whole. There 
were several divisions and struggled between members of the Reagan Administration chief 
among them Congress versus the various security actors including the defense department and 
the CIA. There were also divisions amongst the coordinating attacks on communism from the 
CIA and DEA, especially in Colombia. 
 The Drug Enforcement Agency under Ronald Reagan played a crucial role as well in the 
fruition of the Reagan Doctrine. Historically the DEA had been thought of as an agency that 
would receive funding as part of a larger domestic budget from the Federal Government. Under 
Reagan, the DEA turned into an agency not only interested law enforcement but thought of as 
larger domestic defense from drugs primarily coming from outside of US border. It was the DEA 
that saw the largest increase in funding over any other government agency in Reagan’s, a 43% 
                                               
14 Pach, Chester. "The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy." 84.. 
15 Ibid. 
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increase in actual spending.16 The increased DEA budget directly resulted in a spike of the 
number of DEA special agents available for groundwork in fighting drug traffickers, particularly 
in South Florida a destination for most of the US illegal cocaine, marijuana imports.17 Naturally, 
there was also an increase in federal prison space because of the higher number of drug-related 
arrests during the early Reagan years. The first DEA administrator sworn in under Reagan was 
Francis Mullen who began his work in leading the agency in 1981.18 Cooperation was a major 
feature of the DEA belief system under Mullen who wanted other defense agencies to work 
together to fight for justice in the “War on Drugs.” The cooperation Mullen appealed for would 
not only involve the sharing of classified information between the CIA, defense department, and 
DEA but make the drug problem an issue of foreign policy. Under Mullen, the plan wasn’t to 
allow the drugs to reach the US and deal with domestic drug handlers but to reach beyond 
Florida closer to the source of where the illegal substances were grown. Even with the increase 
in special agents, the DEA required more strength to reach the lofty goal of providing consistent 
pressure against such forces at the level of these Central, South American Cartels. Parallel to the 
time of the rise in power of the DEA the US military’s budget increased but remained focused on 
fighting Communism, which was thought to be a separate issue. The aspirations of Mullen 
provided PMC’s such as DynCorp at this time called Dynalectron an opportunity to fulfill a 
security role desired by the DEA in Colombia, the cocaine capital of the world in the 1980’s.19 
 Cocaine as a drug will always be associated with being the commodity that helped propel 
infamous figures such as Pablo Escobar or El Chapo and even story legends such as Scarface to 
power. Cocaine and its distribution are glamorized but what is often forgotten is the degree of 
                                               
16 Williams, Phil. "The Reagan Administration and Defence Policy.” 203. 
17 Williams, Phil. "The Reagan Administration and Defence Policy." 205. 
18 Williams, Phil. "The Reagan Administration and Defence Policy." 210. 
19 Petersohn, Ulrich. "The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War 
Severity between 1946 and 2002.". 195.  
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violence that comes with the illicit drug trade. A common misconception of the conflicts brought 
on by drug trafficking is that a simple binary exists between some “federales” and the 
“banditos.” The conflict between the imagined Feds and the Drug criminals involves crazy 
shootouts that characterize the Wild West nature of the drug trafficking business. However, there 
is clear evidence to persuade those people just the opposite about the actors involved in the War 
on Drugs. Not only were the major actors involved on all sides of the Colombian to US trade 
tactical, thoughtful with every move made against their enemies, the binary that pitted the good 
side versus the bad side does not represent this case accurately. There was an assortment of 
actors in the early 1980’s that had a relationship with the sale of Colombian-based drugs and 
enemies couldn’t be discerned solely based on the group's opinion on drug trafficking. At one 
point or another, even the highest authorities and justices were complicit with the sale of drugs 
putting even more importance on the study and understanding of the motivations of actors at 
each point in time. 
 Colombia during the end of the 1970’s and early 1980’s was the prime example of a 
problematic country that represented all the worries of Reagan’s foreign policy. The Colombia of 
1981 was one of great turmoil and political instability. Colombia historically has been divided 
between a more established conservative group and a surge of various leftist groups who were 
ready to do almost anything to defend their causes. The main leftist political groups of the late 
1970’s were the ELN, FARC, and M-19 who openly declared themselves Marxist or communist 
influenced. As if Colombia's political climate wasn’t enough for the Reagan Administration to 
avert its attention to the region the trafficking of cocaine manufactured had a meteoric rise that 
paralleled the rise of Marxist groups.20 By the standards set by the Reagan Doctrine in its efforts 
to eradicate communist influence in any vulnerable peripheral state, Colombia met all the 
                                               
20 Bagley, Bruce M. "Colombia and the War on Drugs." Foreign Affairs 67, no. 1 (1988): 70-90.  
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checks. Regarding regions of focus for the US in its struggle to slow drug trade Colombia was at 
the center of it. Based on the ability of Colombia during the early 1980’s to meet the criteria set 
by Reagan that require the intervention of some sort it’s a surprise that thousands of troops didn’t 
arrive at the Panamanian border after his inauguration. Despite, how clear the Colombian 
situation was as a threat to his US interests, the course of action for how the US would address 
Colombia’s instability is complicated. 
 The inability to understand the behavior and alliances of actors in Colombia played a 
crucial role in the US ability to aid Colombia in how it aspired to. From the political side of the 
conflict, the governments represented a unified conservative, capitalist perspective. However, the 
presumed “enemy” of the US-backed Colombia state in 1981 led by Julio Turbay a former 
Colombian ambassador to the US had almost a dozen different leftist groups to combat.21 Aside 
from the three main Left parties mentioned above, there were eight other guerrilla organizations 
reaching fighting operating Colombian military personnel in various locations. US enemies in 
Colombia were not unified during Reagan’s time compared to the way the FARC dominates the 
voice of the leftist revolution in today’s Colombia. The divided left meant that the number of 
conflicts was more frequent but smaller in scale on average. There was an almost systematic 
wave of violence and clashes between the Colombian military fighting in the rural outskirts far 
beyond the streets of Bogota. Peasants were the ones representing these Leftist groups recruited 
by educated, ideologically-motivated leaders like a Fidel Castro. Their rural areas were often 
homes to the guerilla fighting camps, and as a result, even bystanders were forced to take sides. 
The diversity of players in the ongoing Colombian civil war of the late 1970’s and 1980’s was in 
antithesis to the Vietnam War. The failure to eradicate a communist regime in a forceful nature 
by the US military under Nixon in Vietnam would only spell more trouble for a standing US 
                                               
21 Bagley, Bruce M. "Colombia and the War on Drugs." 75. 
14 
 
military presence in Colombia with similar fighting environments and less clear targets. What 
this meant for the conflict was that Reagan had to rely on extremely heavy aid including 
economic support to the Colombian government and American weaponry. What was lacking in 
this aid was often the intricate beneficial influence and training that could come normally come 
with US forces being stationed in a conflict zone. In other parts of Latin America, dictators such 
as Rios Montt and Military officials from all across Latin America would come to the US 
entering in places such as the infamous School of Americas for guidance on successfully 
suppressing communist opposition.22 The turnover of Colombia’s headship didn’t allow for the 
coordination of meaningful US military training in the region. PMC’s played a part in the 
training of Colombian military personnel, and smaller groups of mercenaries were used in the 
more regular but less intense skirmishes that could’ve required the overcommitment of US 
personnel. Mercenaries ability to more independently be broken down into small groups and 
flexibility is strategically advantageous for support in proxy wars. 
 The other side of the conflict or at least a different aspect to what historians call the same 
continued history of La Violencia which is the violence that plagued Colombia dating back to 
1946, was the drug war. Massive success for Colombia drug manufacturers occurred in the 
1970’s and 1980’s. The process of cocaine from coca plants of the Andean mountains, to the 
refined cocaine product in Colombia, and eventually the American consumer, was a transnational 
project requiring an extremely organized syndicate. These groups are called cartels, drug 
supplying businesses whose understanding of how to keep themselves and their profits intact 
meant far more than just being under the radar. In fact, the Cartels the US and the Colombian 
government were up against in the 1980’s used the same sophisticated, subversive tactics. With 
                                               
22 Garrard-Burnett, Virginia. Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit: Guatemala under General Efrain Rios Montt, 
1982-1983. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
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the money that was accumulated by the sale of drugs which was said to be up to billions of 
dollars, the Cartels positioned themselves to compete on a variety of different outside of 
engaging in gun-toting standoffs. 
 The Medellin Cartel led by the Ochoa Vasquez brothers and Pablo Escobar was the most 
powerful Drug Cartel in the world during the 1970’s and 1980’s.23 Fortune Magazine famously 
included Escobar in its 1987 international billionaire's issue, when the Cartel was said to be 
making profit margins of over $3 billion US Dollars per year during the decade.24 To maintain 
and obtain those high level of figures Escobar’s group had to operate in a way that allowed them 
to combat not only Latin American governments but the almighty U.S. reach of justice. 
There are three main features of the Medellin Cartel to examine that made any US-
Colombian attempt to take it down difficult. Firstly, the organization was incredibly 
decentralized. Despite many of the lords of the Cartel owning incredible wealth, the organization 
itself didn’t put a plethora of responsibilities into one person or assets in one area. A difficult 
task for the US involvement in Colombia, especially the DEA, was that the Medellin Cartel 
required widespread attacking to cause serious trauma to the organization. The dispersion of the 
Cartel’s wealth of assets also meant that similarly to the fight against communist groups an 
effective attack would need to be one involving numerous task forces and smaller combat 
groups. Secondly, the group employed tactics to control the Colombian judicial system and 
moreover the political system that went far beyond the traditional bounds of a crime syndicate. 
The Cartel used the traditional route of extortion to the corrupt local policeman, judges, and city 
officials.25 However, Medellin used the services of independent assassins also known as sicarios, 
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to kill off any government authorities formulating any plan of arrests or outing of Cartel 
members. By 1987 in less than 20 years, over “50 judges, at least dozen journalists, and more 
than 400 police and military personnel.” had been assassinated by Cartel affiliates.26 Their ability 
to keep a keen eye out for any potential person who posed a threat to the Cartel meant that being 
a potential sympathizer to the government was almost as risky as being a communist 
sympathizer. The outreach of the Medellin Cartel and other drug trafficking organizations 
crippled the Colombian justice system. During the 1980’s it was almost impossible for 
Colombia's federal government to independently to reprimand even the most blatant and 
violators of Colombian law. Colombia’s incapability to apprehend drug dealers put more 
pressure on the US to handle in some form or fashion the biggest targets of the War on Drugs 
and a need for protection of its officials. The attacks on the Colombian government for the sake 
of avoiding prosecution weakened Colombia’s conservative regimes in power unintentionally 
benefiting the leftist guerrilla groups to at odds with the leadership in place. 
The third feature of the Medellin Cartel which caused immense difficulties for US forces 
was its indirect tag team relationship to the communist guerrilla groups of Colombia. Often, 
there was violence between the guerrilla groups and drug cartels which relied on the usage of the 
same rural farmlands, for their strongholds.  At other times, they were able to work 
simultaneously to become thorns in the sides of the government. The group M-19 began 
attacking police officials and famously stormed the Colombian Palace of Justice and held all the 
justices’ hostage in 1985.27 This incredibly low point marked a low point of control for the 
Colombian government and what seemed like wasted US taxpayer money considering the 
additional aid from USAID that was being poured into Colombia. For the US, the battles fighting 
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communism and drugs had officially converged during the event of the brief taking of the 
Colombian Supreme Court in 1985 by M-19. 
From a US military lens, there are many similarities in the fight against Cartels and the 
bout waged against communist groups. They both had bases, hierarchical structures, and relied 
on manipulating the everyday citizen to steer away from supporting the government. However, 
the main military strategies deployed against Cartels to strip away their power was 
fundamentally different. A key part of US-Colombia relations in taking away cartel leaders to 
further damage the group as a whole was a push for extraditions. In 1979, previous to Reagan 
coming into office the Carter Administration had signed a US-Colombia Extradition Treaty that 
allowed arrested Colombian criminals to be extradited to the US and prosecuted in American 
courts.28 Being able to have Cartel members in US courts was a valued feature in taking down 
the Medellin Cartel. Not only would the US exercise an authorized practice of international legal 
force the idea was that Cartel members would give up more information to destroy their 
organizations if faced with a much more justice system and concrete punishment. 
Unsurprisingly, extraditions a were a tough task for Colombian Judicial System on occasion they 
were able to capture a person of interest in a case related to the Medellin was keeping them long 
enough to extradite them.29 The Cartels used bribery and intimidation in this realm as well to free 
major players from the holding cells. For example, Jorge Ochoa one of the grand leaders of the 
Medellin Cartel was in the process of Extradition after hiding out in Spain, was brought to 
Colombia but after bribes, a lower court judge unexpectedly released Ochoa before making it to 
the US.30 Again, we see another example where the protection of judges and those related to the 
legal handling of Cartel members cases require protection. The importance of lower court judges 
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and smaller figures meant that the US government wouldn’t be able to extend those services to 
all officials needed thus the argument for private security, in this case, is more reasonable for the 
US desires. PMC’s through advising and any given weaponry gave the Colombian vigilantes or 
defense groups called paramilitaries which will be discussed later in the chapter an improved 
chance to fight off Leftist groups.31 The probability of US soldiers serving as some armed guard 
in the place of the Colombian police would be financially exhausting and difficult for the US. 
Across the Latin American spectrum, the needs to achieve the desires of US foreign policy 
varied and PMCs were able to fill in different ways. 
The Nicaraguan Revolution that occurred over the course of the 1960’s and 1970’s ended 
the Somoza family dynasty’s political rule in Nicaragua, a reign consistently supported by the 
US government throughout its tenure. The result of the overthrow of President Somoza was the 
rise of the FSLN known as the Sandinistas a socialist party. The fear of Sandinista regime for the 
US government was much more concrete than fear potential communist policies injected into the 
nation, but the FSLN was founded on opposing US intervention in Nicaragua at all in a rallying 
cry against new forms of colonialism.32 The Reagan Doctrine and Reagan Advisor’s 
commitment to the revival of containment were put to the absolute test in the case of Nicaragua. 
To give an even bigger incentive to the Reagan Administration’s the Nicaraguan conflict was 
thought to be lost under Carter who cut aid to the conservative Somoza Regime after reports of 
Human Rights abuses by the Nicaraguan military were made public.33 Immediately after coming 
into office the Reagan demanded aid for a rebel force, Las Contras, to undermine the new 
Sandinista regime. The theme of the Nicaraguan case study of 1980’s about the Reagan Doctrine 
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was the dance played between White House between the extent of aid to be authorized and what 
wouldn’t. Despite a clear example to Reagan of the country that represented a threat to US 
interests and security abroad congress remained firm in its desire to push for diplomatic 
strategies over the military plans laid out by Reagan’s top defense advisors. 
Division amongst top decision-makers in the US government in regards to whether or not 
to attack the Sandinista government with diplomacy or physical forces shaped the practice of the 
Reagan Doctrine. Although Congress and outside pressures of international norms were against 
the funding of a Contra War, Reagan had the support of the defense department, of the CIA and 
other agencies. US agencies, in particular, the CIA could operate and stage covert operations 
aside from the direct military intervention so greatly feared by US lawmakers. In March of 1981, 
the Reagan Administration led by Director Casey had already formulated a covert program 
requiring 19 million dollars to support the fight in the “Central American Crisis.”34 Nicaragua 
feared that the state would serve as another Cuba and inspire countries around it to turn away 
from US relations. El Salvador, at the time, had a close relationship with the Sandinista 
government and was a target of the revolutionary group for potential collaboration. As a result, 
the US covert program against the Sandinista regime allowed the CIA to provide material aid 
such as food, weapon support, and advice to the rebels. Simultaneously, Reagan moved to 
cutting all Federal aid to Nicaragua if they continued to engage in strong El Salvadoran 
relations.35 The ebb and flow of authorized support for means of combating of the Sandinista 
government meant that the CIA had to employ ad hoc programs to support the Contras 
continuously. US forces couldn’t be streamlined into Nicaragua or surrounding states 
consistently enough to be stationed anywhere there needed to be military personnel able to be 
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ready on call in a sense. PMC personnel could replace ad hoc committees from a military 
personnel standpoint. Many of the Private Contracting firms were made up of retired military 
officials not just mercenaries and could provide services normally provided by commanders such 
as leading tactical missions from a base for a price. In an even more covert fashion that already 
used by way of the CIA, the Reagan Administration allowed for the use PMC contracting in 
various points of the Contra Wars. 
Reagan throughout his entire campaign was relentless in sticking to the principles of his 
Doctrine and supporting the Contras in their anti-communist struggle. What made the 
Nicaraguan case even more defiant in its refusal to only rely on negotiation was the potential for 
“positive” residual effects. In the greater fight against communism which encompassed all 
Central American states, there were small victories to be obtained in the seclusion of Sandinista 
ideology. A portion of victory included the literal practice of containment which was the idea 
that even if the Sandinista regime was legitimized, the Reagan could limit its influence to only 
within its borders.36 The CIA hoped that if they could produce a strong resistance to Sandinista 
influence in Central America in combination with the International isolation of Nicaragua 
economically, the country would cripple the regime. The destruction of the Sandinista regime in 
a sort of war of attrition would serve as a symbolic example for other countries thinking about 
opposing US involvement in their countries. The biggest slap in the face for the American 
empire was Nicaragua's removal of almost 80% of US business in the country in the five years 
after the time of the revolution in 1979 and take over of the country’s economy.37  
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Honduras played a pivotal role in the infiltration of Nicaragua and a location of many of 
the Contra camps. The presence of US and Contra troops in Honduras territory was very 
controversial amongst Central American leadership, and Honduran President Azcona faced a 
major backlash.38 The stationing of Contra troops paired with US troops in Honduras was far 
from subtle, and there was a shift over Reagan’s tenure as president to absolute reprimanding 
covert operations resulting in illegal behavior. Two main failures during the 1980’s related to the 
of US-Nicaraguan relations that created an attitude of condemnation from Congress was the 
costly Invasion of Grenada and Iran-Contra Affair.  
The Invasion of Grenada in 1983 cost the Reagan Administration a lot of political capital 
and showed lawmakers why US troops should never be used in Latin American conflicts. In 
1983 over 7,000 US troops were deployed to fight alongside remaining members of the former 
government to overthrow the leftist PRG regime that had taken over. Although, the troops were 
effective in destroying a significant amount of PRG’s military over a hundred soldiers died, and 
an unprecedented amount of military assets were unleashed to make sure that outcome could 
happen.39 Post-Invasion the US Congress and various Foreign governments shamed the haste in 
which the President declared to a commitment to the war in Granada. More importantly, 
however, US Congress was able to use Granada as a prime example of why not to support US 
military intervention in Latin America making it nearly impossible for Troops to be deployed for 
direct conflict for the remainder of the Reagan tenure. Reagan responded by advocating for the 
transfer of an increase in monetary aid to the Contras and weaponry rather continue the fight of 
Anti-Communism but avoid losing US troops. Unfortunately, US Congress was also being 
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influenced by outside pressures, particular transnational Human Rights organizations who 
reported on the civil rights abuses of the Contra groups on Nicaraguan citizens.40 To this Reagan 
reached even stranger depths to preserve the fight against the Sandinista regime, shown in the 
Iran-Contra Affair. Entire projects could be dedicated to Iran-Contra scandal, but the CIA 
facilitated an illegal arms deal between Iran and Contra groups by being complicit with the 
Contra's obtainment of wealth through drug trafficking.41 A bizarre incident led to the exposure 
of the Iran-Contra relationship and the CIA’s complicity but again the concept of Plausible 
Deniability used to shield President Reagan’s involvement. However, the evidence of top-down 
collaboration between Reagan’s top advisers and actors involved in making the Iran-Contra 
affair work was overwhelming. The Reagan administration was faced with a situation where only 
the complete transfer of responsibilities to private military firms or mercenaries would fulfill the 
goals without putting his job completely at risk. PMC’s in Nicaragua were used in a wide variety 
of capacities and often, with a very unspoken history. 
When historians and political look back at the Reagan Doctrine they often refer to 
shadow armies backed by US economic and military support engaging in proxy war. Those 
secret armies are the ones mentioned previously in this section, the paramilitary groups of 
Colombia and the Contras. The “secret” armies, individuals, and organizations that will be 
explored in the subsequent sections are representing the private sector differently. 
The covert forces to be evaluated in this research project are Private Military Companies 
are entities assigned to projects based on contracts with institutional forces inherently motivated 
by money rather than political purpose. As previously mentioned it became increasingly difficult 
for the straightforward tactical strategy to be discussed and for the Contras to work under Higher 
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Intelligence Committees that the US can deploy. The aid to Central America became 
increasingly limited for the rebel forces which resulted in a lack of basic leadership coordination 
in missions.42 Along with the lack of leadership, the military hardware sent to Colombia and 
Nicaragua from the US often wasn’t proficiently used because of the lack of education of US-
made equipment such as tracking devices which would benefit Contras in rural fighting.43 The 
Contras would greatly benefit from the presence of any military personnel that could help in 
these shortcomings. Even the CIA officials that were able to consistently play some part in US-
Central American affairs early in the Reagan Administration before Congress’ tight restrictions 
on foreign policy had trouble being able to assist with the wide range of military tasks asked by 
counterrevolutionaries. The emergence of capital for mercenary organizations and micro-
management firms in the 1970’s meant that PMCs could shoulder the load of military contracts 
in an expanded role from earlier Cold War conflicts.44 What this also meant was that the 
mercenaries and military personnel contracted for Latin American were decisively more 
independent than past mercenary relationships for the US. Their independence showed a new 
light for President Reagan and future administrations to direct their energy towards pseudo-
military organizations to combat in proxy wars given their independence and ability to organize 
themselves with the help of PMC advisors without US training. The US would have to deal with 
the unexpected consequences that could occur in a privatized the military industry. Chief among 
those concerns was the worry that the Reagan Administration could be held accountable for all 
actions of mercenaries were clumped into the actions of the Contras. 
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The next section will directly address how PMCs and mercenaries contracted by the US 
government to support anti-communist sides in civil wars were able to represent the Reagan 
Doctrine. The Colombian case will also address PMCs ability to protect government strongholds 
and officials from the reach of Drug Cartels as well. The Key features to look for are the 
outcomes of the skirmishes fought by US-supported groups, the plausible deniability surrounding 
US government-PMC relationships and PMC’s can be responsible for in carrying out the vision 
of the Reagan Doctrine. 
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Chapter II: PMC’s in Action 
 
Colombia’s Relationship to PMC’s 
 
 When the looking back at the rhetoric surrounding the Reagan Doctrine used to the 
reaffirm the US’ presence in Latin America, the US message towards Colombia had a strikingly 
different tone. The central American government’s during the 1980’s were plagued by internal, 
political skirmishes often intertwined in the greater ideological struggle of the Cold War. In 
Colombia, the PMC component to the greater puzzle to move the country forward is very 
confusing because of the stronger relationship between President Julio Ayala and President 
Reagan to start the 1980’s. The broader relationship between the nations is based on the US 
being the main destination for Colombian exports and strong diplomatic ties, which brought 
Reagan’s attention to the greater Colombian experience. Chapter one outlined the main actors in 
Colombia which reflected the range of potential security measures into which Reagan would try 
and address. In contrast to the US tumultuous relationship with leaders of Central America, the 
US maintained strong ties to Colombian leadership. The constant, sturdy diplomatic ties between 
the nations contributed to a US integration into Colombia that was more transparent and 
collaborative in strategic planning in comparison to Central America. Which begs the question of 
why the US felt the need to transition to use the Private Sector as an avenue to ensure US 
security aims in Colombia?  
After 1982, Colombia’s new president Belisario Betancur vowed to move towards a more 
independent Colombia. In post-election victory speeches, Betancur criticized many of the 
choices of past Colombian administrations for being too submissive to US foreign policy. He 
cited  Colombia’s desire to not be a satellite state for US sphere of influence and also a war zone 
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for US battle against drugs which was as he saw it, exacerbated by US Extradition Treaty.45 
Reagan’s immediate worry in regards to a potential shift in policy was President Betancur 
commitment to fighting drug cartels and revolutionaries. If Colombian government were to 
change the level of the tenacity of security measures not up to US standards, then the US would 
need to switch its approach.  
Insert into the picture DynCorp or as it was called up until 1987 DynaElectron, a private 
defense, military, and “global” service contractor for the US. Today the company makes over 3 
billion dollars in revenue with over 95% of its business coming from US contracts ranging the 
state department to the DEA to NASA.46 Given the circumstances surrounding Colombia’s 
foreign policy shift in 1983, to step out of the US shadows, Reagan’s Administration turned to 
DynaElectron to aid in its effort to find solutions to their problems of rising communism and 
drug trade in the region. What this meant was the Reagan Doctrine, and Jeane Kirkpatrick’s 
vision would live on regardless of applying pressure on communist forces including ELN, 
FARC, and M-19 through physical means. 
The decisions made on both the US and Colombian leadership sides were able to happen 
because of the historical, political diversity of the country. Betancur was able to rise to power 
while facing a very divided liberal party and being the moderate conservative. The elections of 
Colombia were often problematic with politicians ties being so deeply rooted in corrupt 
organizations. However, the elections reflected a democratic process nonetheless. As a result, 
Betancur was able to be candid with Washington about his vision of a Colombia as a country that 
                                               
45 Bagley, Bruce Michael., and Juan Gabriel Tokatliain. Colombian Foreign Policy in the 1980's: The Search for 
Leverage. Washington, D.C.: School of Advanced International Studies, 1985. 
46 "DynCorp International." DynCorp International. Accessed January 15, 2018. http://www.dyn-intl.com/. 
27 
 
needed to focus on institutional repair before the needs of outside actors.47 Reagan met with 
Betancur on Capitol Hill in August of 1982 which would be a turning point for both nations in 
regards to future problem-solving in Colombia. Betancur administration was quick to call out US 
relations to Colombia especially under the guise of the IMF as problematic for the growth of 
Colombia’s economy as well as the potential for Colombia to be a legitimate nation. Legitimacy 
for Colombia and Latin American nations, in general, was an important feature to strive for 
which also included security. Betancur took an even greater leap for Colombian independence by 
signing on off the Non-Aligned Movement pact which granted membership to Colombia which 
integrated Colombia back into relations with the rest of the “Global South” and more importantly 
smaller economies who often resisted US influence.48 One of the nations that quickly sparked 
relations with Colombia after the Non-Aligned signing in early 1983 was Cuba. Colombia post-
1982 elections were beginning to become a threat to US interests invested in the country but also 
security at large.49 However, the sheer volume of actors in Colombia over the course of the 20th 
century up until 1982 gave Reagan and US agencies options to work with to achieve their 
strategic goals. 
When President Betancur won the election in 1982, he did so as an independent 
conservative, a moderate with little to say about major reforms but small changes to Colombia’s 
attitude. That wasn’t always the case for Betancur; he was originally a supporter of the ultra-
right-wing party led by Caudillo, Laureano Gomez, which put a stricter emphasis on law and 
order, along with the demand of stronger respect for the leaders in power. Given the history of 
Colombia’s Caudillo rule and struggle with extremist politics on both sides of the political 
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spectrum, Betancur took advantage by appearing as the rational actor during campaigns. Caudillo 
support and right-wing nationalism remained prevalent throughout the 20th century, and right-
wing groups began organizing similarly to its leftist counterparts. Disenchanted with the idea that 
the Colombian government many actors in Colombia formed coalitions and their armies to 
protect their interests.  
The Colombian Public saw paramilitaries as a sort of bodyguard defense for Cartels and 
armies funded by the likes of Pablo Escobar surrounding giant ranches. However, some US 
officials including members of the CIA Department of Defense, and FBI found ways to get 
connected in other coalitions of paramilitaries committed more squarely on ideological beliefs.50 
Within the US relationship with Colombia, one can see the infringing problem with the US shift 
towards alliances with paramilitaries. The goals of the Reagan administration were to not only 
subdue the growth of communism in all Latin America but Colombia halt the growth of cartels 
as manufacturing hubs. The departments of the US military would be hard pressed to be able to 
provide for two different wars in Colombia. The DEA had to pick up for much of the legwork for 
the operations related to Drug Cartels, and while they were able to conduct thorough 
investigations needed ground support for clashes with Drug Cartels.51 Unfortunately for the 
DEA, many of the larger right-wing paramilitaries who were natural allies of Reagan’s advisors 
keen on attacking leftist guerrillas were often funded by Drug Barons.52 As a result, the US 
agencies were often divided in how they interacted with private actors in Colombia. DynElectron 
through orders, sometimes supported right-wing bases and armies funded by Cartels with 
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members that were often criminals of some sort themselves.53 Simultaneously, the DEA and 
other narcotics agencies attempted to use PMC’s to logistically undermine the power which held 
up some of these Cartels including their intelligence networks, material resources, and 
headquarters of Cartels. The greater Foreign Policy question in this context is how do great 
powers decide to act on actions that could boost one side of its interests but hurt another? In this 
case, I want to explore the way in which the US illicit involvement with right-wing paramilitaries 
under Reagan was affected by Danelectro and the private sector’s ability to absolve itself from 
political restraints. 
In several cases throughout the 20th century involving the US military extending into 
Latin America both physically and through its training, a surrogate army of sorts is supported. In 
said Latin American cases often, inner political turmoil within the country will pit one side in 
favor of openness towards foreign intervention to progress by integrating with the globe and 
revolutionary movements. In this binary, it’s clear to see which side would be supported by the 
US in Latin American conflicts. Those opposing revolution, will be exposed to swaths of aid and 
support directly from the US military budget in a direct exchange to continually fight guerrilla 
armies.54 The Nicaraguan struggle for the US post-Sandinista Revolution under Reagan fits the 
mold which makes hypotheses about the rationale obvious for why PMC use can be attractive 
since the work seems straightforward. However, in Colombia, the web of actors and deeply 
rooted violence would not be able to go away during the 1980’s in an end-all war or a war of 
attrition. There needed to be something different in the case of Colombian halting of communist 
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influence in efforts to protect US interests by the Reagan staff that show a less predictable side to 
the usage of PMC’s. 
A major feature of the wars between Colombian Government forces, the ideological 
guerrillas, and drug cartels is their ability to occupy the land. The firepower and casualties 
attributed to Colombian conflict were higher than normal incidents of violence in Latin 
American civil wars because of the resources at the disposal of Drug Cartels. For instance, the 
Medellin Cartel was known for its large settlements occupied by sometimes hundreds of workers 
far outside of the urban center Medellin. Cartel settlements had aircraft for smuggling drugs and 
during that period a sophisticated web of communication which allowed for the Cartel to operate 
logistically at the same standard of investigative police.55 In contrast to FARC or M-19, the 
greater Drug Baron’s relied heavily on physical material, and it’s assets not only to continue to 
money but to fight off insurgent groups trying to stop them. The larger than the imaginable 
profile of organizations like the Medellin Cartel forced the DEA in collaboration with other 
agencies to attack beyond physical measures but attempt to undo the fabric of these syndicates. 
Around the US border defense of drug trafficking there was no change towards a private 
contracting of organizations but rather DEA in conjunction with the US Coast Guard and State 
police. The contracting of Dynaelectron by the US government was solely focused on the 
internal operations of groups within Colombia. The main belief and focus ironically were for 
through logistical support from veteran intel within Dynaelectron made up of ex-officers who 
had served in Vietnam was to provide intelligence to right-wing paramilitaries to match the level 
of organization the Drug Cartels were able to afford. 
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The motivation of the Reagan Government for Dynalectron against Drug Cartels was to 
stop the production of drug crops. The original focus of Dynalectron was original to serve as 
aviation support because of its history of ex-air force pilots within its corporate leadership. 
Knowing the ability of Dynalectron expertise during the beginning of the 1980’s, Reagan’s 
administration reached out to the company about using US military planes and materials to 
destroy the fields that grew marijuana protected by Cartels.56 Later in the history of PMC’s with 
expanded services and increased contracting from US military’s we see the formation of larger 
paramilitaries such as MAS which have an expansive relationship with US-based PMC’s. The 
War on Drugs in Colombia showed a more direct approach with DEA and Narcotics units of 
PMC pilots to destroy reserves of crops surrounding Drug havens in Medellin. The success of 
Drug Cartels was not affected by US and Colombian forces attempt to eradicate the production 
of Coca. Despite during the mid-1980’s only having 12-14% of the globe’s Coca production but 
was responsible for 80% of Cocaine being trafficked which was processed at a higher rate 
following Reagan’s tenure than before.57 The usage of PMC’s didn’t seem to have a major effect 
on the production of the War on Drugs in Colombia or the violence but did manage to slow down 
crop production at Coca fields in Colombia between 1982 up until present day where eradication 
is still supported and practiced. 
On the other side of the foreign policy aims of Reagan’s Doctrine, we see an approach 
that is more problematic for scholars which are the role of PMC’s infighting Leftist Guerilla 
organizations. FARC and M-19 were well known for their larger attempts at overthrowing the 
government with events such as the “Palace of Justice Siege” when M-19 members in 1985 took 
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the Colombian Supreme Court hostage.58 However, revolutionary groups whereabouts were 
concentrated in northwest, southwest regions of Colombia near the base of the Andean 
mountains away from major population centers. The regions occupied by FARC and M-19 
represented a poorer Colombian class, stationed in rural communities of farmers. As a result, the 
more common but also deadly clashes that happened closer to Guerilla strongholds away from 
the cities were less reported. An unintended consequence of supporting right-wing paramilitaries 
and these former Caudillo actors during the 198059’s was that Reagan had to accept the potential 
for civilian harm.  
If American agents or soldiers were to be held responsible for the death of bystanders in 
combat that could’ve done major harm to Reagan’s greater ability to convince Congress and the 
public of his ventures. Already by the end of Reagan’s first term, he dealt with the deaths of over 
240 troops caught up in the Lebanese conflict and drew considerable criticism for the support of 
Central American dictators such as Rios Montt accused of human rights abuses.60 The idea of 
Plausible Deniability returns to the conversation when we dig into ideas about how International 
regulations are surrounding military conduct and codes which if violated with direct linkage back 
to US intelligence at the head of operations could cripple administrations. DynCorp and PMC’s 
were able to fill leadership roles in operations in rural areas and were key in shaping the logistics 
of guerilla interaction. 
During the years between 1982-87, there was the US began being heavily involved in a 
full-on private war with Guerilla organizations. Right Wing paramilitary forces specifically 
focused more on counter-insurgency operations beginning on the 1980’s with the support of the 
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US. It has been stated by many political historians that in comparison of Presidential foreign 
policy behavior in the past in regards to the rise of Marxism and Soviet influence that changed 
with Reagan from Defense to a more preemptive approach to fighting adversaries.61 Reagan, 
CIA Director William Casey, and Jeane Kirkpatrick crafted language that serves as the basis for 
the US support of counterinsurgency operations in Colombia as a guide for private companies. In 
early 1985, Reagan signed off on a 14 million dollar military package to be sent directly to 
insurgents fighting FARC and M-19. Colombia was also receiving hundreds of millions of 
dollars as a nation in federal aid from USAID during the 1980’s, showing the heavy investment 
into the region without direct occupation or control of Colombian operations in civil war or 
handling of Drug Dealers. However, the paramilitaries themselves struggled in tactical warfare 
against FARC and ELN in particular during the 1980’s as both organizations grew to become 
experts at kidnapping, organizing its leadership, and recruiting youth members to their causes.62 
Where resources fell short, the government led by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger had 
reached out to AirScan, Inc, and Dynaelectron to boost the effectiveness of counterinsurgency 
from 1982, increasing funding in 1985.63 
 Airscan Inc. had a small impact regarding the physical presence or employee interaction 
with Colombian paramilitaries, but the known interactions showed the consequences of Airscan 
Inc. influence. Stories of skirmishes between right-wing paramilitaries and guerrillas often 
involved civilian casualties. Paramilitaries often had to seize control of loading zones to take in 
these military grade helicopters and other aviation equipment but in doing so had to take out 
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angry civilians accusing the right wing groups of allowing “gringo exploitation.”64 Seizure of 
land became a huge topic of emphasis as well for right-wing groups relationship with 
Dynaelectron whose employees were often intelligence advisors advocating for tactics against 
the Guerilla fighters which involved camping in private farmland. 
 Dynaelectron employees went beyond the airborne surveillance and aircraft intel which 
other PMC’s had been aiding Colombian forces against Guerilla groups. Paramilitary groups 
benefited greatly from military training from Dynaelectron and even in collaboration with the 
Colombian military. Post-1994 within Colombia and elsewhere around the world DynCorp 
would use their professionally licensed personnel to directly provide security training along with 
mentoring capabilities to maximize advantages normally reserved for US intel.65 The 
groundwork for the company’s close relationship with the Colombian army as a trusted US brand 
comes from DynCorp’s original relationship with paramilitary groups.  
A noteworthy paramilitary MAS, Muerte a Secuestradores or death to kidnappers, 
conceived by wealthy landowners and drug lords who were threatened by Guerrilla organizations 
ability to hold valuable hostage people. Resource-based companies were also threatened by the 
resurgence of Guerilla groups in rural Colombia which led US-based companies such as Texaco 
to spend funds to MAS defense. In late 1981 following the kidnapping of drug lord Jorge 
Ochoa’s daughter, MAS began exercising its power and influence to kill hundreds of members of 
FARC along with other leftist revolutionaries as a defense mechanism for cartels.66 The group 
shifted due to visibility issues and linkage of the killing of innocent people including community 
leaders that were thought to communist sympathizers. As the augmentation of MAS occurred so 
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did the US agencies interest in using its members to carry out a more focused assault on Guerilla 
groups. One of the biggest advantages Dynaelectron was able to do through government 
contracting was provide pilots who had experience in flying combat planes. At paramilitary 
training centers funded largely by drug trafficking money, Dynaelectron employees were able to 
teach paramilitary soldiers how to man complicated planes such as the OV-10 Bronco into 
Andean mountain regions.67 The growth of paramilitary violence grew for a variety of reasons 
within Colombia but MAS relationship with US-based PMC’s was a key factor in the increase in 
bloodshed in the Colombian civil war. Logistically, there was a military presence that was able 
to be felt through the support of paramilitaries which gave a bode of confidence to the US, while 
Dyna Electrons aerial crop-killing support provided direct intervention. Colombia provided the 
grounds for future administrations to see ways in which guided missions can be accomplished 
with US military grade expertise because of the personnel that represented Dynalectron being 
former Air Force members with experience. The trust factor that was gained in this era for PMC 
usage can in large part be cited to the attempts, whether successful or not, by PMC to empower 
paramilitaries and destroy thousands of acres of coca crops. 
 
Nicaragua’s Relationship to PMC’s: Mercenary Inclusion  
Fast-forward to the year 1981 past the bloody civil war that led to the fall of President’s 
Somoza regime in 1979 to new President Reagan’s authorization of Decision Directive 17 a 
decree by the Commander-in-Chief to support Anti-Sandinista forces. UN ambassador 
Kirkpatrick, CIA Director Weinberger, and President Reagan would together embark on a six-
year commitment to take down the leftist Sandinista regime from power. The Nicaraguan 
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mission in comparison to the multi-faceted Colombian civil war and the attempt to overthrow the 
Nicaraguan government of the 1980’s is simply a simple intrusion. The conflict of the 1970’s 
and transition in power to the Sandinista regime left Nicaragua in ruins, with hundreds of 
thousands of local refugees fleeing, and an unrecognized constitution.68 The Sandinista regime in 
which Reagan had set his sights on was tasked with building from the ground up, extremely 
passionate about their cause and mission but with several gaping weaknesses in power.  
The US saw an opportunity for a hands-on approach to Nicaragua in 1982 in a reversal of 
Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy of a willingness to work with the new Sandinista government. The 
dichotomy that existed between the stance towards Latin American sovereignty by Carter and 
Reagan. Under Reagan’s administration another factor in its war and all US surrogates took on 
was a hostile population that didn’t support US intervention in the general population. A part of 
the came from the Sandinista rhetoric led by Daniel Ortega who was able to channel the 
Sandinista energy into specific ideological campaigns with new newspapers such as La Voz de la 
Sanisimo.69 Another key factor into what a decade-long power struggle in Nicaragua would be 
was the US cutting of holistic stoppage of sending aid to the country. Despite the incredible 
tension of the Nicaraguan revolution in 1978, Jimmy Carter called upon Congress for almost $75 
million in aid to send to the Somoza ruling party for the refugees and victims of the war.70 
Reagan decided at the beginning of his first term in 1982 that no aid would be going to 
Nicaragua during Sandinista rule. What this meant was that US-Nicaraguan diplomatic ties had 
been severed by 1982 and all operations of Nicaraguan government would have to come from 
opposition without any form of legitimate power within the state. The US would not be able to 
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divide the state within its leadership because the Sandinista rule was of military dictatorship or 
what is described in Latin American context as Junta rule. 
 The Counterrevolution groups that fought against the Sandinista regime during and after 
the revolution were made up of mainly political dissidents at the head who opposed Left WIng 
policies and former national guard members under Somoza regime.71 The Contras became the 
name of the several organized political and paramilitary groups during the majority of the 1980’s 
who fought against Sandinista rule. Their organization and numbers were great in might because 
of their military history in power and ruling Nicaragua; these insurgents had experience in 
ground combat. Contras early on in the 1980’s weren’t unified and into a single force which 
made their cause weaker in the beginning stages of the conflict. Reagan’s administration and the 
agencies surrounding the White House led by the CIA were adamant about strengthening contra 
operations in what was an uphill battle against communism against the Sandinistas by the mid-
1980’s.  
From the onset the Reagan Doctrine and Kirkpatrick vision never wanted to evolve into a 
pure dismantle of power or in simpler terms, to not create a vacuum through US intervention but 
prop up an existing militant opposition to replace power. Kirkpatrick in a written article, 
Dictatorships and Double Standards, discussed the nature of the struggle of democratic 
institutions to be built under the “wrong” social, political, and cultural climate.72 I note this to 
say that in light of the mission laid out by the UN ambassador of removing the Sandinistas from 
power through Right Wing revolutionaries, the result that was seen was autocratic power. Unlike 
Carter’s foreign policy with a multifaceted humanitarian focus to aid Nicaragua in a multitude of 
problems, Reagan’s government would solely push towards regime change and military 
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diplomacy. A central belief of the Reagan Administration was that if a successful 
counterrevolution to the revolution of Nicaragua the US support of the Contras would have to 
occur covertly.73 Part of the reason was that of the common sense understanding within 
International Affairs that a transparent connection between Contras and the US would require the 
Reagan Administration to answer for whatever actions of the Contras. The initial response to this 
would be the injection of outside actors that could potentially help manifest a counter to the 
Sandinista army with logistical training but also in field warfare at a scale much different than 
Colombia. In taking down the Nicaraguan army, Reagan was tasked with going towards the heart 
of Managua, the capital city, versus the hills where leftist Guerrillas hid in Colombia. 
In 1982 the CIA independently with its budget began spending upwards of $20 million 
US dollars in aid to counter-revolutionaries in Nicaragua which increased by over $5 million in 
each of the consecutive three years following. The CIA was able to equip, finance, and train 
Contra groups, in particular, the Nicaraguan Defense Force, FDN, which was led by a former 
national guard colonel.74 Despite the increase in US support for the Contras and increased 
attacking capabilities for those insurgents by the end of 1983 after several attempts to occupy 
towns within Nicaragua, the Contras owned no significant territory.75 The Contra's tactics 
switched significantly after several failures up until 1984 to a strategy that involved targeting 
civilians and economic centers within Colombia to incite a civil war that involved the uprising of 
civilians.76 The US military influence was only able to increase the statistical edge of the FDN, 
but the group lacked other factors to bring successful outcomes and gain territory. Reagan and 
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the CIA forces would turn up its military aid secretly to $100 million. However, it was private 
sector activity that also created a spark in the war. 
Unlike the civil war in Colombia, the usage of PMC’s against Drug Cartels as crop killers 
or against Leftist Guerrillas as tactical support was much less clear. Mercenary usage became an 
important factor in the attempt to overthrow the Sandinista occupancy ranging from retired 
generals to trained and paid assassins. In the same vein in which Reagan saw an opportunity to 
bring in paramilitary use, he in cooperation with Heritage Foundation and other conservative 
politics agents saw mercenaries as a rational alternative to committing US military personnel to 
the region. In a statement at joint security session Heritage foundation stated, “such fighters 
[mercenaries] could be utilized to keep anti-communist rebel groups alive and strengthen their 
efforts in low-intensity warfare environments like Nicaragua.”77 Tactically Mercenaries were 
sought for the low-risk, low-cost, and high reward value which made going towards this market 
incredibly attractive. The key questions become, what happens to the success in these “low-risk” 
conflicts and the US responsibility for the actions of their paid for soldiers of arms abroad? The 
question of responsibility can be answered in a term brought up in section I called “Plausible 
Deniability.” The success of Mercenaries and PMCs in Nicaragua during the Cold War that 
would give positive signs for continued use of private combat support in future US interventions 
abroad is up in more questionable.  
The CIA and the National Security Council from 1982-1987 used the money they 
obtained illegally to not only support the contras but send Private support. The support included 
private military advisors that flew down to bases in Honduras mainly to strategize with 
insurgents moving across the northern Nicaraguan border. Along with the advisors there were 
privately contracted mercenaries who were able to assist in campaigns of the highest scale as in 
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occupying towns to kidnapping and threatening important Sandinista allies or family members.78 
Separately and together in collaboration with Contra forces, private military actors were not only 
complicit in the civil war but responsible for some of the accusations of human rights violations 
against Nicaraguan civilians. 
A key figure in the story of the use of mercenaries in Nicaragua and necessary for our 
understanding of private contracting at all is Lt. Oliver North a former marine. North would later 
be the central figure in the Iran-Contra Affair which will be addressed later in this section, which 
unveiled a lot of the classified inner workings of the US Defense Department, CIA, and Contras. 
Most notably North’s arrest for his role in the Iran-Contra Affair unveiled a small circle of actors 
that played a part in bringing mercenaries who had served in past proxy Cold wars from Angola, 
Congo, and Rhodesia.79 
 The Contras compared to other backed US insurgents in the region of conflict had the 
numbers and passion from the Sandinista revolution but lacked direction. The mercenaries 
brought into The Contra War were not frontline soldiers but generals and often leading strategists 
on co-opted missions. For example, in 1988, seven men a part of various US private paramilitary 
organizations such as Civilian Military Assistance, who supported the contras were indicted for 
bringing assault weapons from Miami to Nicaragua and training Contra soldiers on how to use 
the weapons.80 The Contras would then work with US-based advisors with the US arms they 
received to understand efficient insurgence from former US military Generals and Marines who 
had retired to work in private military firms. Another aspect of mercenary usage was in 
organized groups to perform small operations that were more for special operations. For 
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example, former navy independent contractors collected into small insurgent units to attack the 
western coast of Nicaragua and Managua, the capital, from Lago de Managua to destabilize 
Sandinista coastal defenses which were the first line of defense.81 Overall, one could say that 
mercenaries were specialists and worked as the technicians for more specific operations. 
However, research has proven that many mercenaries and contractors were foot soldiers who 
blended into the Contra armies. The network of mercenaries was divided into different divisions 
that all served individual purposes and with a fighter with different motivations. Regardless of 
how mercenaries were selected by US contractors, the result was the same: support the Contras 
in their fight against communism. 
In one of the most interesting discoveries in research surrounding the US-PMC 
relationship, Nicaragua had a lot domestic US support for their cause. Many American 
organizations during the 1980’s were structured as political movements with the resources and 
power to also independent support for foreign organizations. The most notable independent 
movement that supported conservative actors in Central America was the “religious right” led by 
televangelist preachers such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson. Although the reactionary 
“religious right” movement which started in the 1970’s wasn’t a PMC or aided any Central 
American regimes with military support, they embodied the connection between ideologues of 
America and US foreign policy. Many military firms had greater political aspirations compared 
to a global security company such as DynCorp who was motivated primarily by trading labor for 
money.  
Groups such as the Civilian Military Assistance based in Decatur, Alabama were 
accounted for in 1987 for independently taking on Leftists Guerrilla groups in their stance 
against communism. Two American bodies were found after being shot out of a helicopter by 
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Sandinista forces in 1987.82 The recovery of the bodies raised questions for the general public’s 
understanding of the Cold War, the transparency of the use of the private sector in American 
proxy wars wasn’t clear at the time. The American’s were a part of the Civilian Military 
Assistance (CMA) and had personally decided to join the FDN in its fight against communism 
while also hoping to deliver military aid which their organization collected from a variety of 
private citizens help. What makes the CMA odd in their role in the private sector is that they 
weren’t contracted by the US government, yet are fulfilled the same duties as paid-mercenaries 
aiming to attack leftist guerilla camps. In the case of these independently passionate private 
organizations, scholars find it difficult to figure out their role in the Cold War conflicts and also 
Reagan’s influence on national support from conservatives for the Contras. Despite, the 
complex, layered reasoning behind the motivations of such conservative groups to use their 
resources for battles, we know that they often filled a similar role of PMC’s which requires them 
to be accounted for within Reagan’s Foreign Policy. 
By 1987, the Sandinista government remained in control of Nicaragua although the 
relentless insurgencies from US-backed Contras and other paramilitaries opposing the Sandinista 
regime. An even worse turn of events that spoke a lot about the inner workings of the US 
government especially CIA developed a relationship with the Contras and private military actors 
happened in 1987 described as the Iran-Contra Affair. At the center of the Iran-Contra Affair was 
Lt. Oliver North who orchestrated more than just getting former generals and ex-military to act 
as advisors for the Contras as previously mentioned, but covert, illegal funding for the fight 
against the Sandinistas. What was revealed in the Iran Contra scandal, which plagued the Reagan 
administration, was the covert nature of funding and the more “true” path of some of the people 
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that worked closely with the operations. The vagueness of presidential foreign policy doctrines 
such as the Reagan Doctrine, leave historians often confused with what encompasses the actual 
vision of the US administration and how individuals such as Oliver North put their effects on US 
management abroad. 
During the latter years of the Contra war as mentioned in Chapter one, it became 
increasingly difficult for “war hawks” in Congress and Reagan to allocate more federal monetary 
aid to the Contras. As a result, the CIA through a handful of individual agents, chief among them 
Oliver North embarked on a scandalous operation to get funds to the Contras to obtain arms and 
other weaponry. There is a larger story within the Iran-Contra that also is representative of the 
hypocritical nature of Reagan’s foreign policy in the Middle East, which is the sale of arms 
under the table to Hezbollah a paramilitary ally to the state of Iran who was fighting the US-
backed Iraq government of 1985-87. The tens of millions made from 3rd party deals to Irani 
affiliates went to offshore Swiss bank accounts before being turned into usable weapons for the 
Contras during the mid-1980’s.83 The outcome from a very simplistic nature in the scope of this 
essay is that the Contra-Sandinista war was able to continue past at a vibrant level, relentless 
attacks including hundreds of casualties in Nicaragua past 1984 when Congress tried to stop 
funding of the war by the US. The continuation of the Contra War came at the price of 
potentially compromising at least in some part to the US support of Iraqi forces against Iran and 
negotiations with Iran. The compromises that the US government makes to support conflicting or 
in this case a taken opportunity to risk one situation for the sake of interests, elsewhere reveals a 
lot about US foreign policy under Reagan, which is a lot more complicated than written 
strategies or speeches given at international summits. A lesser-known fact that came out of the 
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exposed communication dialogues between Caspar Weinberger, Oliver North, and other CIA 
officials was the money allocated to mercenaries. 
Oliver North as an ex-official himself by the time he played a major part in the Contra 
War beginning in 1983 had an extensive connection with private military advisors and 
mercenaries who operated in the Angolan of the 1970’s in another Cold War proxy conflict 
involving Soviet influence.84 A major part of the scheme to take money from military equipment 
sales into the Middle East during the Iran-Contra connection was to have flexible money for CIA 
controlled forces to use beyond weapons. Mercenaries could lead ground forces in low-intensity 
conflicts as they are often framed by military scholars involving personnel in the low hundreds 
or often much less on the battlefields of Nicaragua. It was a known secret amongst the CIA 
officials under Reagan that similarly to the Angolan Civil War, that mercenaries and PMC 
advisors would lead these battles in Nicaragua against Sandinista strongholds almost as a US 
defacto army.85 Control, was a major theme of the US-Nicaraguan relationship when it came to 
the connection between the Contras and privately contracted organizations via US influence. The 
word private didn’t necessarily spell to reflect the “private” sector or somehow independent of 
government influence in the Nicaraguan civil warfare during the 1980’s but rather a shift in 
liability. The question that arises in the case of Nicaragua, much different than the case in the 
complicated circumstances of Colombia, is a rather simple one: did the covert insertion of the 
private military to the aid of the Contra’s produce successful results based on the aims of the 
Reagan Doctrine. 
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Chapter III:  Analyzing the Conflicts, Understanding the Future 
 
 In a review of the US involvement in Colombian and Nicaraguan internal conflicts from 
1981-1989, the influence of Reagan’s emphasis on privatizing various sectors of the US 
government was felt heavily. The implementation of privately contracted companies uses of 
equipment, fighters, and personnel into US intervention provided contradicting results for the 
doctrines of the Reagan Administration along with the aims of the US-backed right-wing groups. 
The contradictions of goals for Reagan were felt strongly in a few different revisionist 
perspectives. When looking at the specific proxy conflicts in Colombia and Nicaragua for the US 
compared to US military faults in Vietnam, many mistakes that were US officials were looking 
to avoid repeating were. Before examining the different measurements of how PMC use fit into 
the product that the Reagan Doctrine vision created or this period’s place in greater history, it’s 
important for us to understand what exactly changed in policy and warfare for the US during its 
transition to private military contracting. 
 One of the major features highlighted in scholarship for those condemning the Vietnam 
War was the large amounts of soldiers stationed in battle with heavy artillery and equipment 
stationary costing the government millions of dollars. Many of battles of Vietnam were not 
fought in “traditional” or any clear battlefields but rather attacking Viet Cong and guerrilla 
fighters in jungles where US superior weaponry was neutralized.86 As a result of one of the main 
differences in which I noticed, the US attempted to take advantage was to trust, whether 
intentionally or not, the Contra’s self-defense in bases from a manpower standpoint to not waste 
troops. American soldiers were not brought into Nicaragua in droves, but instead, higher ranked 
lieutenants in collaboration with Advisors from PMC were brought in as US extension in the 
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region. The goal was with a smaller pool of US personnel to focus on breaking down the war 
into smaller skirmishes that were “lower risk.” What is shown in many of the newspaper articles 
and reactionary primary sources of the 1980’s was that despite the lower intensity of the wars 
high-risk situations still arose.  
Civilian casualties are a major point of emphasis when discussing military intervention in 
foreign countries because of non-combatant deaths ability to bring more attention to conflict or a 
magnifying glass to covert operations. Another reason is the way in which civilian casualties 
being a clear sign of disrespect of sovereignty and the international system. When Reagan came 
into office in 1981, his inaugural year in office and the following year a combined total of 167 
people considered civilians were killed by Contra attacks. However, in 1983 “the number of 
deaths rose sharply to 1,030 and then rose again to 1339 in 1984 and 1463 in 1985” all years 
where there was increased funding of the Contras but also increased the presence of privately 
contracted military personnel in Nicaragua.87 These deaths were mainly directed to government 
workers or civilians with ties to the Sandinista regime. It’s not unusual whatsoever to imagine 
the soldiers of a sovereign state in another or even military within their home state patrolling 
areas not deemed to be the “battlefield.” However, it’s unusual and problematic when relooking 
at conflicts where the civilians in countries of war became the targets. It’s truly hard to measure 
the repercussions of having civilians blood being directly related back the government, or in this 
case, the hands of the CIA’s contracted fighters during the 1980’s.  
We know though with the growth of human rights organizations during the 1970’s that 
the trajectory would only continue into the 1980’s despite a major change in presidential seats 
after Carter. The 1980’s are also known for being the decade of neo-liberalism starting in major 
markets such as the UK deregulation under Thatcher and of course Reagan’s tendency to favor 
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laissez-faire policies. Access and exchanges of not only business but also information for a 
multitude of technical reasons as well became easier. I would argue the rapid spreading of 
information hurt the secrecy of Reagan’s covert operations and rallied opposition against known 
conflicts like the Contra War. Opposition came in droves during the latter years of Reagan’s 
tenure from newspaper editorials to reports from organizations of the stature of Amnesty 
International who called out not only the Contra army but mercenaries as well for Human Rights 
abuses. A group called the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights had a New York Times wrote 
about a report they made in 1987 claiming to show the Sandinista regime’s relentless campaign 
of detaining those who supported the Contras and Contra fighters violence against civilians.88 
This instance gives insight into the public’s direct access to information that would directly 
implicate the US’ government support of guerilla terrorist group is shocking on the onset but 
more significant for another reason.  
The various human rights reports and subsequent international trials that came after 
involving US-backed rebels along with dictators depending on the country in Central America 
showed the overall sloppiness of the intended lowkey nature operations. “Low Intensity” 
conflicts as described in section 2 quickly escalated to endanger larger communities, and through 
various organizations, conflicts were exposed for their abuses of civilians. My view is that Iran-
Contra Affair and illicit support of right-wing paramilitaries were directly coming back to 
Washington the use of PMC’s had to change. In combination with some reasons which I will 
discuss later including the new emerging market which incentivized PMC’s to grow larger and 
diverse in capabilities, how the 1980’s under Reagan under Reagan gave pretense for the 
privatization of the military. 
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During the Reagan Administration, his foreign policy in Latin America specifically 
against drug cartels in Colombia and response to the Sandinista revolution may have been having 
been the focus of this project, but the US military as always was stretched around the globe 
during the 1980’s. Reagan’s strategy of a sort of “new containment” was financially more 
supported in Latin American countries where his foreign policy advisors saw the biggest threat 
but Asia, Africa, and Middle East internal conflicts were addressed as well. The most famous 
case of the “hot” nature of the Cold War was the US support of Afghan mujahideen militants 
who were trained by US soldiers to expel Soviet fighters who were physically occupying a 
propped up communist regime in Kabul.89 The US response to Soviet Union’s occupation and 
influence in much of Afghanistan cost the government upwards of 20 billion dollars in federal 
aid from 1981 until the Geneva Accords of 1988 when Soviet leadership agreed to leave 
Afghanistan.90 High amounts of federal spending weren’t only allocated to interventions in the 
Middle East under Reagan but also Angola and Cambodia in similar levels of intensity. In 
Angola, members of the Heritage Foundation along with other American conservative leadership 
had close to ties to the right-wing UNITA movement and leader Jonas Savimbi. Service in 
support of Savimbi’s troops went so far as to arm his guerilla fighters with stinger missiles 
amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars aimed at communist fighters in Angola including 
30,000 Cuban soldiers stationed in Angola.91 Tens of millions of US dollars were being spent 
directly from the CIA’s budget and USAID’s budget towards supporting a competing rebel 
group in Cambodia after a Vietnamese invasion backed by the Soviet Union led to an unstable 
political climate. Overall, the 1980’s foreign interventions were not solely based on Central 
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America although that is where as Ambassador Kirkpatrick wrote in her “Dictatorship's & 
Double Standards” would be the focus of US foreign containment policy. 
Understanding the indifferent approach to how involved the US would be in conflicts 
abroad despite what seemed like a regionally specific focus of the Reagan Doctrine is important 
to understanding the military interventions under Reagan. To look at the scope of the US 
interventions abroad provides insight to combat one of my earlier hypothesis on the use of PMC 
usage. I hypothesized that part of the benefit of a move towards outsourcing military 
responsibilities to the private sector would be a decrease in federal military spending while still 
supplying the force needed for communist defense abroad. Surprisingly, despite various covert 
operations around the globe including the illicit off-the-book funding of Contras in Nicaragua 
and right-wing paramilitaries in Colombia, the federal military budget increased significantly 
under Reagan each year in office. President Reagan’s budget proposals from 1981 to 1984 saw 
an increase not only of defense spending by over 20% but an increase in the budget despite 
enacting massive tax cuts for middle and upper-class Americans at the same time.92 The findings 
are surprising, given the alleged theme of the Reagan tenure being to promote privatization of all 
public spheres of influence and a smaller government more efficient. The transition towards an 
increased amount of government to private military firm contracts under Reagan didn’t equate to 
a smaller federal military budget or a more efficient focused military spending. 
Another feature of Reagan’s foreign policy wrapped up in the fighting that occurred in 
Latin America is the immigration of Central Americans to the US as a result of the increased 
violence of the civil wars during the 1980’s. US people are caught coming over the US-Mexican 
border there is an assumption that the immigrants coming into the US are of Mexican coming for 
a more traditionally motivated reason such as work opportunity. The “immigrants” were refugees 
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of civil wars, mostly from Central American origins during the 1980’s from El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua amongst other countries below Mexico. The US support of rebel 
groups to increase the intensity of the war on communism under Reagan meant an increase of 
illegal immigrants as they were described by the US government in the 1980’s because of the 
danger civilians were put in. On the one hand, Reagan’s foreign policy put a newfound pressure 
on his immigration policy as the demographic coming into the US changed dramatically to a 
majority Latin American pool of people coming in. The Central American population within the 
US tripled from 1980 to 1990 and continued to increase to this days following years of unstable 
governance stemming from the Contra War amongst other US involved conflicts.93 As 
mentioned earlier Reagan granted amnesty to three million Central American refugees in his 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 which is major foreign policy. The increased 
migrant population who were refugees of US involved civil wars in Central America, put a 
magnifying glass out on Border Patrol as Americans shifted interest to border security. Similarly 
to other defense forces, under Reagan, we see the birth of a Public-Private partnership led by the 
US government to independent Border Security companies.94 The Mexican border post-1986 
began an upward trajectory towards a total crackdown on future immigrants despite what seemed 
like a transition towards recognition of US own accountability in fueling the wars that caused 
hundreds of thousands of Central Americans to flee their homes. A byproduct of the Reagan 
Doctrine was the increased funding towards Border Security for the US-Mexican border. 
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Before looking at the future trajectories of the US Public-Private relationship of military 
contractors, Colombia and Nicaraguan cases should be reexamined to understand what ended up 
happening to the goals of Reagan. In Colombia, the broader vision of Reagan’s War on Drugs 
was to eliminate the size and influence of Drug Cartels in not only Latin America but their US 
presence. Kirkpatrick and other foreign ambassadors also aimed to re-strengthen right-wing 
authorities in places with the major organized communist opposition. To measure the success of 
these two significant missions of US policy we have to separate them and look at the available 
data points that could quantify the progress of the conflicts that show either a favorable or 
negative direction of US interests during the 1980’s. The War on Drugs revival during the 
1980’s, specifically the cocaine usage outburst in major cities in the US translated into a surge in 
research to understand the distribution of drugs. The central attributes to highlight in the progress 
of the “War on Drugs” during Reagan’s tenure are the rates in which cocaine was trafficked into 
the US, the rates of production of cocaine by the Medellin and Cali Cartels, and the ability for 
DEA supported forces in Colombia to take down Cartel leadership.  
Sources from reports from independent think tanks data to known DEA seizures to 
estimates from field analysts from around the world who had been in Colombia all showed one 
thing in common throughout their work in the 1980’s: Cocaine trafficking out of Colombia at no 
point slowed down during the decade. A multi-part series was released by the Wall Street Journal 
in collaboration with the Netflix series, Narcos, which summed up the Medellin Cartel at their 
peak. No matter what the DEA was able to do regarding intrusion including, “seizures of tons of 
Cocaine in the US failed to dent the supply.”.95 The Supply chain was much stronger than it 
seemed even the US government could imagine mainly due to the prices that the US consumer 
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market was willing to pay which gave rise to tens of billion-dollar industry far beyond any drug 
supply the world had seen. The inclusion of private contracting had no bearing on the amount of 
cocaine that was trafficked over the Reagan years because it is very apparent any US-backed 
operation including the literal removal of tons of cocaine off the market didn’t slow sales for a 
variety of reasons. However, the specifically targeted major cartels of Colombia especially the 
Medellin Cartel infrastructures were damaged by strategies under the Reagan Administration. 
By the end of the 1980’s, it was a known fact the Colombian government was almost 
incapable of arresting and holding the major Drug Barons, but extradition to the US put fear into 
the likes of Escobar and the Ochoa Brothers. Getting individuals farther away from Colombia, 
away from law and a judicial system where Drug Lords were above seemed to be the only way to 
hold them accountable to a make a push towards slowing down their businesses. In Section I, we 
examined the way in which the 1982 extradition treaty allowed agents and PMC supported to 
right-wing paramilitary soldiers were able to put pressure on the bases of the Cartels beyond 
trying to catch the Crime bosses in public or transit.  
The effects of the extradition treaty and willingness of the US government to surpass 
sovereign rights or belief in the Colombian quickly brought positive results under Reagan. Many 
Drug lords left Colombia as a result of the pressure being put on by the DEA and their new status 
not just of enemies of the state but global criminals. A major part of the extradition treaty and 
any cases where individuals are arrested to be sent to another country for trial is that it’s up to the 
authorities of the said country to make the arrest. Normally, based on the early attempts at the 
beginning of the Cocaine empire in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s the extradition treaty would 
serve almost no purpose.96 However, during the period between 1982 and 1987 during the 49 
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major members of Cocaine empire had been extradited to the US including Carlos Lehder a co-
founder of the Medellin Cartel.97 Part of the success can be attributed to the DEA’s relentlessness 
to send investigators and agents into Bogota amongst other cities to aid Colombian law 
enforcement in their efforts to destabilize the cartels. Another major part less known but shown 
in much of the scholarship is the ability of right-wing paramilitaries and former national guard 
members to put physical pressure on cartel strongholds. The lack of public support for the 
Colombian Congress during the 1980’s included an unfavorable view of US intrusion into 
Colombia meant that US troops being visible on the ground could potentially increase support 
for Cartels even more. Private contracting allowed for paramilitaries and Colombian military to 
receive American equipment along with organized training which allowed Cartels to be 
overwhelmed in some skirmishes which led to extraditions for traffickers trying to escape the 
country. Overall, evidence has shown the continuation of the massive sale of drugs continue 
throughout the 1980’s, but the leadership of the Medellin Cartel began to crumble going into 
1990’s. 
The other side of the US foreign policy in Colombia was the ability of Colombian 
military forces to subdue the spread of communist support from ELN and FARC influence. ELN 
and FARC war against the Colombian government considering the history of La Violencia was 
never meant to be solved overnight or even during Reagan’s tenure. The US foreign advisors to 
Latin America under Reagan hoped to curb specific goals of the Leftist Guerrillas. The two main 
goals of US security in Colombia within the containment strategy in my view demonstrate 
success or failure is the ability for FARC to move their forces from remote mountainous region 
to medium-sized cities and casualties comparing Guerilla groups to Colombian Military losses. 
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By looking at the shift in ELN/FARC presence from rural areas to bigger cities, we can get a 
sense of the shift in support for the established Colombian government and a potential change in 
political ideology throughout Colombia. The casualties disparity between the opposing sides of 
the proxy war represents the effectiveness of US contracted PMC aid in combination with the 
high volume of advisors in Colombia versus Soviet-backed leftist guerrillas. 
FARC leadership had extensive training from the Soviet Union and the main weapon of 
usage for FARC infantry during the 1980’s was the AK-47 famously used by Vietnamese 
Guerrillas as well.98 Right-wing paramilitary groups were armed with American made rifles and 
ex-generals who worked in Dynalectron were able to provide strategic support. The usage of 
PMC’s also provided a different avenue of support that wasn’t available to the Soviet Union who 
was unable to commit troops to the region or provide eyes on the ground. FARC’s desire to 
move into the larger cities was supplemented by the major boom in the informal Colombian drug 
economy and the newfound resources it produced. An unintended factor is a way that the Leftist 
Guerrillas got into the drug business eventually working with traffickers and dealers in the 
1990’s to present day, but its origins were more based on its leftist connections with Soviet 
benefactors. The answer to the question of the success and failure of isolating the FARC regime 
to the outskirts by the US supported Colombian military is complicated, but we know based on 
the transition towards the end of the decade FARC was unsatisfied with their power. From 1984-
87 the Colombian government under Betancur agreed to a ceasefire with ELN and FARC 
leadership. The Leftist Guerrilla groups were unhappy with the amount of power they wielded 
from trying to attain power through the political machine with parliament seats and elections 
because over 4,000 kidnappings by FARC-EP occurred starting in 1986 until the end of the 
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decade.99 In my view, the continued kidnappings and willingness by the FARC to reap the 
benefits of the drug business despite risking the support of everyday middle-class Colombians 
comes from the fear of the growth of the paramilitaries.  
The growing capabilities of the paramilitaries were directly related to the ability to the 
CIA led by Caspar Weinberger's ability to secure funds to make sure privately contracted 
advisors from Dynalectron along with then-current military generals from the Vietnam war could 
work with Colombian military soldiers. Political climate plays an important role in the necessity 
of PMC usage; visibility played a much different part in Colombian power struggles than 
Nicaragua. The Colombian struggle needed the support of the people because of the strength and 
history of different party leanings versus smaller countries with less established party lines such 
as Nicaragua. In this case, PMC’s were very effective in aiding allies to eliminate Lefist Guerilla 
heads including over half of the known UP, Union Patriótica party elected officials in which 
FARC integrated themselves into were murdered mysteriously undermining the growth of leftist 
politics in Bogota.100 Understanding the dangerous and often violent ways the US supported 
Colombian military was able to neutralize Communist violence is an example of ways where 
greater US intervention of conventional means would be less effective. 
Not only were FARC political allies and leaders under threat the group itself experienced 
an incredible amount of losses while it’s ascension to power in the late 1980’s. Commissions 
investigating the violence in Colombia have emerged more recently that put together complete 
estimates on the numbers of lives lost and people displaced during the 1980’s and 1990’s.101 The 
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reports show the violence which has consistently been prevalent in the various waves of political 
conflict in Colombia peaked after 1982 with the emergence of right-wing paramilitaries banded 
to fight. Guerrilla groups bought out by Cartels and backed by US funds.102 The peak in violence 
can obviously be attributed to the spark in money coming into the Colombian economy through 
drug trafficking, but the ability for smaller armed paramilitaries to conduct damage on 
populations is heavily influenced by their use of military grade weapons. Of the over 2,000 
recorded incidents between 1982 to the year 2000, Over 60% were committed by paramilitaries 
killing many innocent civilians but also devastating FARC forces. PMC influence was felt at 
large, and the groundwork for future contracting was laid in the bed made by right-wing 
paramilitaries ruthless attacks on rural Guerilla bases in Colombia. 
The use of PMC’s and mercenaries within Nicaragua on behalf of the US showed less 
promise and much more confusion for the resulting takeaway of the Contra War. The conflict in 
Nicaragua in the onset was staged with a more toned down sense of urgency from Washington 
but quickly resembled a smaller scale Vietnam situation. How could a country, the United States, 
that’s so large with so much power do so little with so such weak resistance, struggle to exert its 
will in the “third world”? Lack of efficiency of military interventions in the “third world” was a 
common criticism of the failures of the war in Vietnam. The US during the first few decades had 
either overcommitted troops and resources to no avail or not stayed involved enough in the proxy 
war region. The struggle between the two paths arose again as was visited in the early sections 
about Congress’s refusal to continue to send large blocks of aid to Nicaragua for military 
purposes versus President Reagan’s desires to escalate combat. A strategic advantage was 
previously mentioned about PMC’s ability to work as a counteracting force against political 
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opponents who don’t want to deploy US troops on the ground abroad, but little was said about 
the magnitude. Did the inclusion of PMC aid and mercenaries by US generals into the Contra 
Forces turn the Cold War in Nicaragua hotter? The easy answer is yes but how that put pressure 
on the Sandinista military and give hope to possible regime change is a bigger question. 
The few detailed examples of covert missions such as American helicopter pilots 
delivering Contra soldiers or mercenaries leading operations into Nicaraguan cities shed light on 
how entrenched the US was in the Cold War without being held accountable. I want to push that 
research given the examples of the Contras benefitted from PMC involvement through the US to 
understand linkage to the Sandinista military reign. The bigger picture shows that up until the 
very end of Reagan’s presidency on January 20th, 1989 the Sandinista Military had predominant 
control of Nicaragua it’s major cities, economy, and political control over its citizens. Changes 
from Somoza regime were extreme, but not all of them were “for all the people” as they may 
seem including suppression of free press in the first half of the 1980’s.103  I see this as a major 
benefit for US covert operations that ended up playing into the favor of the nature of the 
mercenary helping the Contras known to brash in decision making and treating civilians like 
combatants. A major issue of mercenary use and supporting rebel armies is their threat to 
innocent civilians, putting blood on the hands of US federal lawmakers. Another aspect to 
Nicaragua and its bordering countries compared to other communist states in contention was 
their lack of defiant leadership of the likes of a Ho Chi Minh, or Fidel Castro left the Sandinista 
regime less supported by the general public. FDN was able to organize with other 
counterrevolutionaries in Guatemala and Honduras at the beginning of the 1980’s with advisors 
pouring in from the US. Despite the explosion of US interest in boosting the strength and morale 
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of FDN forces up until 1984 counterrevolutionaries were unable to acquire any significant town 
or city under their control.104  
As mentioned previously, the worst aspect to the failed attempts by the Contras in 
attempting to gain territory in Nicaragua northern borders especially a town such as Japala of a 
lower spotlight was that civilians were the primary victims of the bloodshed. Tactically, US 
advisors and ex-military officers brought into Central American countries to train soldiers by 
Oliver North himself struggled with penetrating Sandinista defenses. The war became a battle on 
two fronts with the main FDN forces coming from the Northwest region of the Honduran-
Nicaraguan aimed at the more populated cities of Western Nicaragua. At some point to my 
understanding, the only thing that was lacking from other wars and situations where ground 
forces aren’t making headway is some aerial support or missiles. I bring up secondary options 
not to say that missiles were necessary or even on the table considering the lack of support for 
military intervention in Nicaragua during Reagan’s time in office to being with but to show the 
Contra War was a losing effort for the first half of the 1980’s. PMC’s helped train the soldiers, 
but a factor that wasn’t considered and makes me re-evaluate the potential use of PMC’s is the 
inability of the Contras to create a civil war climate or engage the population in believing that 
this was still an issue of who’s in control.105 The Contra's tactics reflected the lack of 
effectiveness of the aid and months of retraining they received from US officials in neighboring 
countries to Nicaragua. Soon after 1983, FDN was reported to resorting to high amounts of 
kidnappings of government family members and showed signs of desperation. In 1985 the 
Counter-Revolutionaries death toll reached over 5,000 for the year significantly more than any 
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other year of conflict.106 Despite the US created efforts in Nicaragua failing and independent 
FDN reclaiming of territory along with support from the Nicaraguan people hitting a brick wall 
by 1985 Reagan reasserted the US backing of the Contras. Hence, the Iran-Contra scandal to 
bring even more weapons for the Contra soldiers, mercenaries, and rare peasant sympathizers 
against the communist agrarian reforms. Unfortunately for the Reagan Doctrine and war hawks 
in D.C. during the 1980’s relishing in the idea of plausible deniability through trusted private 
military advisors leading the Contra War, the support didn’t provide positive results for the FDN 
resurgence. So why possibly would continue to wholesale pledge millions and even billions of 
dollars to the private contracting today not just for regime change in Iraq similarly to Nicaragua 
but continue to fight the “War on Drugs” with PMC’s leading the cause? 
The future of PMC and mercenaries’ role in American conflicts beyond Reagan’s Latin 
American doctrine was shocking based on the outcomes of the goals he set. The “War on Drugs” 
continued today through an American aid initiative called PLAN Colombia which again put 
DynCorp at the center of military operations. The turmoil in Nicaragua hasn’t necessarily 
subsided at all looking at post-Reagan Nicaraguan violence, but US interest has turned elsewhere 
towards the Middle East most prominently. US military intervention into Iraq under President 
George W. Bush infamously included military contracting through Halliburton and other private 
parties which has been dramatized in movies such as ‘War Dogs.’ Amongst the general public 
who follow the news or are up-to-date in the US presence abroad including the ‘War on Terror,’ 
there is no surprise that private contracting dominates the military landscape. I return to a set of 
explanations that I argue bridges the gap between the known effects of outsourcing military 
responsibilities at the end of the Cold War under Reagan and heavy usage of PMC’s today. The 
reasons I propose for PMC use flourishing post-1989 are the ability to sustain US presence 
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abroad in areas of conflict or where US bases are lacking when troops are not deployed, 
plausible deniability in the age of increased transparency, and military industrial complex that 
was well documented in the Public Sector shifting to the private sector. Before we explore each 
reason, I want to briefly discuss PLAN Colombia and Halliburton’s service in the War in Iraq as 
points of reference. 
PLAN Colombia ironically lays out everything described by Reagan in speeches and 
from his administration's press releases in very concrete terms which would be signed into an 
agreement by Colombian President Andres Pastrana and President Bill Clinton.107 The irony is 
that the initiative which gave the US rejuvenated access to fighting Colombian drug cartels and 
left-wing insurgents, the FARC never died out in the 1980’s or 1990’s’s, they haven't received 
since Reagan’s term.108 For US military intervention scholars it’s ironic because if one was to 
look at what the objectives of PLAN Colombia it would seem that this was the US first attempt 
to bring the War on Drugs down to Colombia. President Pastrana pushed for an economical 
solution which would allow foreign investors and US aid to come into Colombia to give farmers 
alternatives to producing drug crops. The US strategy quickly shifted to arming the Colombian 
Military with advanced weaponry and helicopters to push into Southern Colombian strongholds 
for Guerilla opposition. Under Bush Jr., the US invested over 2 billion dollars in funds towards 
US-led Colombian military programs including a contract with DynCorp worth over 450 million 
dollars for aviation support to eradicate drug crops.109 During the Bush administration, the 
Colombian Military benefitted from having the latest US equipment such as night-vision goggles 
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and night tracking surveillance but still were unsuccessful in slowing down the sale of drugs in 
the slightest bit.  
In fact, although cocaine usage among Americans has decreased in the last few decades, 
the Cocaine market has opened up because of Colombian traffickers connection to Europe which 
has empowered Trafficking Cartels and FARC.110 US policy objectives seemed to have come up 
short once again, by the end of 2008 cocaine usage was down in value significantly by over 8 
billion dollars from an estimated 43 billion dollars in market value to $35 million, but trafficking 
into Europe canceled out much of the losses for Colombian traffickers. FARC by the end of 2008 
hadn’t agreed to any cease-fire or surrender and wouldn’t until in 2016 a year after the end of 
PLAN Colombia. During this time, DynCorp made anywhere from $1 billion to 4.4 billion 
dollars in annual revenue and by 2015 grew to over 20,000 employees with over 550 locations 
being the world’s largest military contractor in Latin America.111 In parallel with DynCorp rise 
to prominence and wealth, the company was being more publicly exposed. Eventually, DynCorp 
found itself being sued by a variety of sources most notably Colombian farmers poisoned by the 
reckless nature in which pesticide flown by DynCorp contracted pilots were spraying in the 
Northern Colombian border.112 Given the Reagan Era as a blueprint for PMC involvement in 
Colombia, I would argue that the biggest beneficiary of the US intervention into the Colombian 
civil war was DynCorp. 
In the war in Iraq, the presence of Private contractors is much more complicated 
regarding US responsibility because of the amount of money allocated to putting individual 
contractors on the ground as soldiers compared to relying on private companies for services. 
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Hundreds of private military contractors, who negotiated with the US, from all over the world 
but mainly from the US and UK were killed in combat of some sorts.113 The contractors that 
were killed in Iraq during the 2000’s were known deaths of PMC workers whose names were 
never brought out to the media or formally recognized by the military since they weren’t 
technically members.114 Unofficial combatant deaths not claimed by the US is a clear example of 
the Plausible Deniability factor from Reagan’s tenure coming into effect under Bush not having 
to confront retributions of mishandled operations by contractors who have been excluded from 
general public discourse surrounding the mistakes of operation “Iraqi Freedom.”  
Halliburton is a multinational oil-field service company based in Houston known for 
contracting work to extract natural resources and energy from around the world. The two main 
points about Halliburton for this research is that firstly Halliburton was the CEO of Halliburton 
leading up to his run as Vice President in the year 2000.115 Secondly, Halliburton through its 
subsidiary at the time KBR at the in 2001 was awarded a LOGCAP contract. The KBR contract 
asked for a variety of military services primarily the attacking of terrorist bases in Iraq including 
a transition scheme with the President and future administrations to ease troops out of the region 
and use contractors while still training Iraqi soldier pushing regime change in their country.116 
These awarded contracts are worth hundreds of millions of dollars often and provide countless 
job opportunities to expanding private firms such as KBR. With incentivized businesses and a 
growing private military industry, it’s hard to expect that there isn’t pressure outside of D.C. to 
conduct business with PMC’s despite whatever outcomes are on the other side. The effects of 
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PMC contractors in Iraq are still being understood to this day as the War on Terrorism, and 
Iraq’s political stability itself continues to unfold but what scholars know for a fact as that the 
amount of PMC available in the Middle East contracted by the US increased tremendously from 
2003 to 2010. The strategies were providing unchanging results in the War on Drugs and even 
deteriorated results such as higher military spending or civilian casualties associated with PMCs 
in Nicaragua along with the later Iraq conflict. The more entrenched US got into military 
interventions abroad no matter the result PMC is trending as a more prevalent option in US 
military interventions then, and in the future, we should expect even less of a role from US 
military personnel in American wars abroad. 
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Conclusion 
 
Ronald Reagan’s inauguration into office on January 20th of 1981 was the dawn of a new 
era and direction for US governance in many ways. There are a variety of different policies 
produced out of Washington’s bureaucracy during the 1980’s which would affect the lives of 
Americans at home and across the world, but through this project, we understand just how 
related these seemingly widespread goals were. Underneath the era of Neoliberalism led by 
Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and other leaders interested in changing global dynamics 
directly with what in contemporary discourse termed globalism, was the shift in all facets of 
governmental practice. The military often thought of as the almighty branch of the US federal 
body began the shift towards relinquishing its duties to represent the US as a world power in 
foreign interventions. The transition to outsourcing military duties is proven in the very 
aggressive, consequential involvement of PMC’s in Colombia and Nicaragua. 
By using the Reagan Doctrine and the broad values of the US intent to subdue communist 
influence in their proverbial backyard of Central America along with the US determination to 
slow the flow of drugs into US borders, we can understand the areas of war in which PMC’s 
were included for. However, it’s the specific case studies of the shortcomings of the agencies 
such as the CIA and DEA to make any tactical adjustments to effectively achieve US stated 
missions that reveal more about the usage of PMC’s. The implementation of PMC’s and their 
continued increase have gone beyond the outcomes of the conflicts. Whether we’re looking at 
the failure to shut down the “War on Drugs” in Colombia which has seen two different major 
attempts an over a decade apart to stop or the non-removal of the Sandinista rule, Latin 
American interventions were overall unsuccessful under Reagan on the surface. Beneath the 
surface, the groundwork was laid out for the potential of PMC and another mercenary usage that 
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did prove to have some advantages for US interests despite not being pivotal to destroying the 
opposition completely. 
Firstly, PMC has grown in their capabilities regarding the flexibility to do whatever is 
asked of US military. The competitiveness of the private sector and experience that can be 
gained from working in PMC’s allows for their professionals to perform at a high level. The 
main part of this is the maintenance of the war, which was highlighted in the history of DynCorp 
in Colombia which brought aviation equipment and pilots into the “War on Drugs” to attack drug 
farms.117 The ability for contractors to become experts in areas and occupy dangerous regions 
beyond when US military involvement is apparent is another key factor in the positive results of 
outsourcing military services. Next, looking at the plausible deniability of politicians and US 
government responsibility within military interventions PMC’s are a clear advantage over the 
deployment of US personnel. Globalism has had an upwards trajectory with technology which 
has led to a new world of accountability and transparency. In the modern political climate much 
is being revealed to the average citizen around the world making leaders interested in ventures 
involving military intervention much more hesitant in their approach to deploying force. The 
unwillingness to put US troops on the ground abroad has been reflected in US intervention in 
Syria today with the common theme being airstrikes often with unmanned jets.118 All signs have 
pointed to a “modernized” less involved US military regarding actual physical cost while still 
applying the same pressure against adversaries as before. 
The profiting off of wars and more opportunities for money to be made through the 
business of preparation of going into combat for the US isn’t a new idea. In 1961, during his 
farewell presidential address, Dwight D. Eisenhower famously warned his viewers and listeners 
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of the dangers of the military-industrial complex.119 The idea that the cyclical nature of an 
improved economy after the war and the need to feed an industry that requires US conflict 
abroad has fluctuated in scope due to the shift towards outsourcing military duties to companies. 
These PMC’s based in the US have made billions of dollars through military contract almost 
exclusively since DynCorp was able to land its contract in Colombia which sparked the 
frequency of major security deals.120 The Invasion in Iraq and Halliburton’s role as a security 
contractor in various Iraqi regions for US forces but also energy companies is the perfect 
example of the blurred line between US security interests or US economic opportunities for the 
private sector. PMC proliferation is concretely tied into the military industrial complex under a 
different way for security firms to take advantage of conflict in greater scope than weapon 
manufacturers during the 1950’s in the Korean War under Eisenhower. 
The US involvement in the Contra War and covert intervention into Colombian civil 
conflicts are the foundation for all post-1980’s PMC involvement in US foreign intervention in 
addition to any future combat. Nicaragua’s “low intensity” nature or at least how it was 
described under the first years of Reagan allowed for an avenue for PMC and Mercenary 
effective to be tested in a much different way then inclusion in Colombia’s internal issues. 
Reagan’s ascension to the president as the candidate to reverse Carter era policies and push for 
privatization is also in the fabric of shifting military operations. The 1980’s led to a sharp 
increase in PMC contracts and the money generated in the private military sector from the 
continued War on Drugs to regime change in the Middle East. The future of US foreign policy 
that includes military intervention based on the trends of the PMC industry can expect to be even 
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more reliant on outsourcing of services that will put into question what the role of the US 
Military branches will even be in the years to come. 
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